An entire country held its breath the other week at the sight of the twenty Israeli hostages still alive coming home to their families, after two years of suffering, and a determined public campaign. There was a sense of relief, mixed with sadness, for those who were returned and those who were returned in coffins, amid an elusive desire for closure. But as catharsis begins, questions also arise from the pages of the agreement just signed at Sharm el-Sheikh. "The devil is in the details, and, in the end, someone will have to delve into them," says Prof. Elie Podeh, an expert on the modern Middle East, inter-Arab relations, and Israel's Middle East policy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
For 30 years, Podeh has been researching the players involved in the agreement that is now materializing - the Palestinians, Egypt, Qatar, the US, and, of course, Israel. Between 2004 and 2009, he served as head of the Department of Islamic and Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University, and he is currently president of the Israeli Association for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (MEISAI), as well as a member of the board of directors at Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Podeh has researched not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also the peace treaties signed with Egypt and Jordan. It is precisely because of this deep understanding that Podeh sees many landmines lying in wait.
"When you read all the 20 points, you see that it's composed of several plans, or a plan with several stages. After we pass the first stage, the first four to five points, most of the plan is still ahead of us. The problem is that there are no details in it and it’s not clear what exactly is happening," he explains. "Let's say we get to the question of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip - who’s going to do it, when is it happening, how much will be done? How will it happen? If you don't complete a given stage of the agreement, you can't move on to the next step. In other words, at each and every stage, we apparently - or not just apparently - get stuck."
One of the main landmines in "The Day After" plan relates to the demilitarization of Hamas. "Hamas's ability to survive and deploy in Gaza, after two years of war, is surprising. At the moment, it’s demonstrating authority and control on the ground," says Podeh. "Hamas has a certain quantity of weapons - we don't know how many. Someone needs to disarm it. I tend to believe that they themselves won't do it. And even if they do, who will make sure they don't hide other things? The multinational force that will enter the Strip will have to ensure that demilitarization is carried out. This is no easy process, because Hamas will make every effort to remain a significant factor in the Gaza Strip, even if it is not the régime."
According to the agreement, reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will begin with the deployment of a multinational force to maintain order, after which a Palestinian technocratic administration will be established to manage Gaza during the transition period. The administration will be overseen by a "Board of Peace" headed by US President Donald Trump and other members, including former British prime minister Tony Blair. Once the Palestinian Authority implements reforms, it will regain control of the Gaza Strip.
Let's start with the International Stabilization Force (ISF), which is defined in the agreement as having both Arab and international partners. Do we know which countries will be included?
"One of the candidates is Indonesia, which is also a member of the UNIFIL multinational force in Lebanon. This force was established in 1978 after Operation Litani, (the military campaign to distance terror cells from the Israel-Lebanon border in response to what became known as the 'coastal road massacre'). Its mandate was changed in 2006, following the Second Lebanon War, so that it could act to prevent terrorism, but, in practice, it didn't work. Over the years, UNIFIL's freedom of movement has been greatly curtailed by Hezbollah, and we know how much Hezbollah has grown in the last twenty years. UNIFIL has never arrested a single Hezbollah member. So our experience shows that an international force meant to curb terrorism has limited capability."
"The Palestinians view Tony Blair as anti-Arab"
What about the technocratic administration, the Palestinian professionals who are eventually supposed to replace the multinational force? We hear that the Gazans are opposed to Tony Blair being the one to serve alongside Trump on the "Board of Peace." Why is that, actually?
Tony Blair’s name provokes criticism among Palestinians, largely because of Britain’s role in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, including the decision to send 45,000 British troops. Many Palestinians view Blair as distinctly anti-Arab. Also, Britain’s involvement also evokes memories of its colonial past. Even setting those issues aside, assuming there is genuine interest in forming a prvisional technocratic government, the question remains: how will there be agreement on who will take part?
"It brings to mind the story of the Palestinian delegation to the 1991 Madrid Conference - a peace initiative held after the First Gulf War. At the time, choosing who would join the delegation was fraught with complications. They talked and argued about each and every name, since delegates had to be Palestinians but not affiliated with the PLO. Israel rejected this name and that, and it was a big mess. Let's say even if we reach an agreement on the technocrats and let’s say they administer the Gaza Strip temporarily - what comes next? In the long run, Gaza must be governed by a permanent body that is not Hamas. According to the current Israeli government, it should not be the Palestinian Authority, but there’s no avoiding it - the Palestinian Authority is the entity with international legitimacy. Even under the Trump plan, the PA was envisioned as the authority to govern Gaza."
Do the Gazans want the PA to return to the Gaza Strip?
"It's a question that's hard to answer. In my estimation, they want to see a Palestinian entity, period. They don't want a foreigner, and by foreigner I also mean Arab countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. It has got to be a Palestinian entity."
The agreement had to include some recognition by Israel of a potential Palestinian state, but as expected, the wording was convoluted: '"The conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people." One way or another, Israel will have to address this issue.
"The wording that appears in the agreement is a work of art, because in fact what is stated is not that the United States recognizes a state, but that it recognizes this aspiration of the Palestinian people. What I'm getting at is that the concept of a 'Palestinian state,' is now on the table. As soon as this enters the discourse - and given that 153 UN member states recognize a Palestinian state - this issue will be on the regional and media agenda in the near future. Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, at the Arab-Islamic extraordinary summit in Qatar in September, said unequivocally: We are in favor of a two-state solution that consists of Israel alongside a Palestinian state to be established within the 1967 borders.
"In the end, between the Jordan River and the sea, we have about seven million Jews and 7 million Arabs, including Israeli Arabs," says Podeh. "This is the demographic situation. They're not going anywhere. So, offer some other solution that will eventually lead these two peoples somehow to live side by side."
"Secret ties with Indonesia since the 1960s"
Trump was photographed at the conference in Sharm el-Sheikh shaking hands with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. What does this indicate for the future of the region?
"This conference was important, because it was there that the commitment of the signatories to the agreement was anchored. The fact that Turkey and Qatar (countries that are also close to Hamas) are among the leaders is not good for us. The fact that Egypt is there in a central leadership position, and also hosted the conference - that's very good. It's a shame that, at present, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have chosen not to lead this process, because their input inside Gaza, with their ability to invest, is very important. It would have be appropriate for Prime Minister Netanyahu to be there as well, but I assume that he gave up on coming for political reasons. He preferred not to have the voting public link him with support for a Palestinian state, and he was willing to pay a price for it. The price is an uncomfortable situation between him and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who invited him."
On that same day, there were also reports that Indonesian President Pravo Subianto would visit Israel, but this was later denied. What do you think happened?
"Many may be surprised to hear this, but Israel and Indonesia have had many behind-the-scenes ties since at least the 1960s. There were times when we also sold them weapons and equipment. All these things were carried out in secret. Since 2000, Indonesia has become a form of democracy, and public opinion has become more important. Since then, relations have cooled and the Palestinian issue has come up. In the past year or two, the issue has come up again, and the reason for this is that Indonesia wants to join the world's leading economic club, the OECD, of which Israel is also a member. In order to join, all member states must agree on it, and in this sense Israel has a card. To gain Israel's consent, Indonesia needs to establish diplomatic relations with it. It's just that it was claimed - and I think with a great deal of justification - that the Indonesians are waiting for the Saudis."
And here there another is a complication, because at the moment the Saudis are conditioning progress toward normalization with Israel on Israel's progress on the Palestinian issue.
"That's right. At present, Saudi Arabia, together with France, is leading this entire parliament to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. How is it possible to retreat from statements of this kind in the face of the whole of Arab public opinion? It's complicated, but in the same breath I'll say: it's not impossible. It may be possible to find some convoluted formulation that Israel agrees to, and that speaks of less than a state but satisfies the Saudis who come and say, 'Okay, here we have some kind of beginning of the road to a Palestinian state.' The current government is far from any such discussion, so at the moment it seems irrelevant. If we go back to Indonesia, if the president had come, the visit would have been a kind of recognition of the State of Israel. In other words, he gives something, without receiving anything in return."
You are also very familiar with the successful peace agreements that Israel signed with Jordan and Egypt. What led to success there, versus the failure to end the conflict with the Palestinians?
"Right now, what matters is the mistrust that exists on both sides. Trust is one of the most important components of negotiations. With Jordan, it was relatively easy, because we had had relations with the Jordanian royal family since the days of King Abdullah I, during the British Mandate. With Egypt it was more complicated, because we fought against Egypt in several wars. But since 1971, through the Yom Kippur War, the separation of forces and the prisoner exchange that followed, and of course Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Arab Peace Initiative, the infrastructure for rapprochement had been created. It still wasn't sufficient, and another year and a half passed before an agreement was reached.
Still, there’s a difference between dealing with a state, which has multiple interests, and dealing with a terrorist organization. Hamas - and we saw this very well - did not care about the Gaza public at all, to the point of being willing to sacrifice it completely.
"When the motif of martyrdom, the sacrifice for the sake of the idea and the religious faith, leads you, then all means are legitimate. It is quite clear that there is opposition to Hamas within the population in Gaza, but it’s difficult to know how much. It's a mystery. And Hamas, of course, is broadcasting a kind of victory. It's pretty amazing, but it's not surprising. Hezbollah has never raised a white flag or admitted defeat ."
"Pause in fighting may be Hamas’s chance to survive"
Both Qatar and Turkey, which took part in the negotiations to end the war, have been double-dealing Israel for years: on the one hand, they are in contact with Israel and exert pressure on Hamas to end the war, and on the other hand, they were also the ones that provided Hamas with economic oxygen. Did these two countries give guarantees to the Hamas, de facto ensuring its survival? Podeh believes this cannot be ruled out.
"If Israel hadn’t given assurances that it wouldn’t resume the war, why would Hamas have agreed to release all the hostages? That was its main bargaining chip - and its greatest fear: that after freeing the captives, Israel would restart the fighting. In my view, certain promises were indeed made, whether in writing or orally, and some clauses in the agreement remain confidential. In time, we’ll learn what they contained. So by not renewing the war, a by no means small, and even large opening has been left for Hamas to survive as an organization."
Finally, it seems that the US administration wants to see Gaza as part of the plan to create an economic corridor that includes India, the Middle East, and Europe (IMEC). To what extent is this a "Trump Riviera in Gaza" type of fantasy?
"The economic interests are enormous, because we are talking about an economic corridor that will pass from India to Europe through the Middle East. On the way, it passes through several countries, including of course Saudi Arabia, and it can pass through Jordan - depending on its exact route. But the idea is that, in the end, you have to get to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea can also be reached through Gaza, and as far as we are concerned, it is very important that it should also pass through Israel.
"As far as Gaza is concerned, this could be an extraordinary economic bonanza. But my feeling is that it’s running ahead without stopping, it's really the endgame. The potential is political and economic, and it may also have military implications. Already today there is a kind of security alliance, and it is the one that defended Israel in the war against Iran (according to reports, this was on the part of Jordan and Saudi Arabia). I think we're at the beginning of a process that can go in all kinds of directions, and it can certainly go in a good direction as well."
Published by Globes, Israel business news - en.globes.co.il - on October 21, 2025.
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